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I. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST EX-OFFENDERS
In January 2004, George W. Bush slipped an unexpected sidenote into his State of
the Union address. Introducing his last proposal of the evening, he stated, "This
year, some 600,000 inmates will be released from prison back into society. We
know from long experience that if they can't find work, or a home, or help, they
are much more likely to commit crime and return to prison." 1 Bush's statement
and accompanying proposal for a $300 million prisoner reentry initiative 2
signaled a new era of bipartisan recognition for the need to provide support to the
hundreds of thousands of prisoners released into United States communities each
year.
3
Despite this apparent support for policies facilitating the reentry of ex-
prisoners into mainstream society, finding employment as an individual with a
criminal history remains exceedingly difficult in today's job market.4 Not only
does America's population of ex-offenders already lag behind the general
population in traditional qualifications of employment (e.g., education, work
experience), 5 but criminal records themselves also restrict opportunities for
employment-first through licensing statutes that formally exclude individuals
* J.D., Harvard Law School. Many thanks to Elizabeth Bartholet, Michael Meltsner, Paul Samuels
and the staff of the Legal Action Center for their assistance and inspiration in the writing of this article.
1. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20,2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html.
2. Id.
3. More than 630,000 people are released from United States prisons each year; this is more than four
times the number released 25 years ago. AMy L. SOLOMON, KELLY JOHNSON, JEREMY TRAVIS & ELIZABETH
C. MCBRIDE, THE URBAN INSTITrTE, FROM PRISON TO WORK: THE EMPLOYMENT DIMENSIONS OF PRISONER
REENTRY 1 (2004).
4. See generally RICHARD B. FREEDMAN, THE URBAN INsTrruTE, CAN WE CLOSE THE REVOLVING
DOOR? RECIDIVISM V. EMPLOYMENT OF Ex-OFFENDERS IN THE U.S. 9-11 (2003), available at http://
www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=410857.
5. Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael and Michael A. Stoll, Will Employers Hire Former Offenders?:
Employer Preferences, Background Checks, and Their Determinants, in IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE
SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION 205 (Mary Pattillo, David F. Weiman, & Bruce Western, eds.,
2004).
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with certain types of convictions,6 and second through the hiring preferences of
most employers for individuals without criminal records.7 A recent survey of
employers in four major metropolitan areas reveals that employers are highly
averse to hiring ex-offenders; only 12.5% of employers said that they would
definitely accept an application from an individual with a criminal record, and
25.9% said that they probably would.8 These employer preferences seem
"rational" in that they flow from a reasoned assumption that individuals who have
committed crimes in the past are more likely to pose risks in the workplace.
However, the discrimination resulting from such "rational" assumptions runs
counter to society's interest in allowing ex-offenders to become full, legal
members of their communities.
President Bush's emphasis on preventing recidivism is one of the strongest
justifications for policies that seek to promote the hiring of individuals with
criminal records. This public safety explanation emphasizes the risks to society's
general welfare that emerge when former offenders are released into communi-
ties without the financial support and social stability that flow from permanent
employment. A number of studies establish a link between unemployment and
recidivism, finding that ex-offenders who are unable to secure jobs upon release
are much more likely to re-offend than those who are employed.9 In addition,
although absent from President Bush's speech, at the outset it is worth noting two
other strong arguments in support of policies that seek to reduce barriers to
employment for ex-offenders.
The first centers on the staggering effects of employment discrimination
against ex-offenders on African Americans and Latinos. Because two-thirds of
inmates in United States prisons are African American or Latino,10 the
widespread denial of jobs to individuals with criminal records disproportionately
affects these minority groups. This contributes to the high rates of unemployment
within African-American and Latino communities and furthers the association in
6. See Bruce May, The Character Component of Occupational Licensing Laws: A Continuing Barrier
to the Ex-Felon's Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. REV. 187, 188-93 (1995).
7. See generally Devah Pager, Double Jeopardy: Race, Crime and Getting a Job, 2005 Wisc. L. REV.
617, 622-27, 640-44 (2005).
8. Holzer et a., supra note 5, at 210. This number is especially significant when compared to employer
reactions to other stigmatized groups: 92% of employers would be willing to hire an applicant who is a
former or current welfare recipient, 96% would be willing to hire applicants with GEDs instead of high
school diplomas, 59% would be willing to hire applicants with a spotty employment history, and 83%
would be willing to hire individuals who have been unemployed for a year or more. Id.
9. See generally JARED BERNSTEIN & ELLEN HOUSTON, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, CRIME AND
WORK: WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM THE Low-WAGE LABOR MARKET (2000); Bruce Western and Becky
Petit, Incarceration and Racial Inequality in Men's Employment, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 3 (2000);
May, Real World Reflection, supra note 6; Christopher Uggen and Melissa Thompson, The Socioeco-
nomic Determinants of Ill-Gotten Gains: Within-Person Changes in Drug Use and Illegal Earnings, 109
AM. J. Soc. 146 (2003); ROBERT SAMPSON AND JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING: PATHWAYS AND
TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE (1993).
10. MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 124-26 (1999).
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the public mind of the menacing ex-felon with a face of color." Indeed, a recent
study of employment practices in New York City by Devah Pager and Bruce
Western found that a criminal record has more severe consequences for African
Americans applying for jobs than for white applicants.' 2 The study followed
pairs of job applicants with identical resumes and found that while white
ex-offenders received a call-back from an employer two-thirds as often as equally
qualified white non-offenders, black offenders received a positive response from
the employer less than half as often as black non-offenders.' 3 As Pager and
Western conclude, these results "suggest[] that race and criminal status interact to
intensify the stigma of official criminality." 14
Second, the accumulation of civil sanctions upon release from prison serves to
exclude ex-offenders from full participation in the social contract, 15 and
employment restrictions remain one of the most visible of these barriers to full
participation in mainstream society. Scholars and activists in recent years have
questioned the attachment of increasingly numerous civil (or "collateral")
consequences to criminal convictions.1 6 From restrictions on welfare benefits to
limited access to housing to the employment barriers discussed in this Article,
these legal constraints are classified as civil sanctions rather than criminal
punishments. 17 Denying a job to an individual because of a conviction for which
she has already served her time arguably punishes her beyond the appropriate
extent of the law.' 8 Further, the attachment of civil consequences to criminal
convictions has profound effects upon the communities into which ex-offenders
return upon their release. With employment, for example, the difficulties faced by
individuals with criminal records in their searches for legitimate employment
affect not only those job applicants, but also the children, families and
11. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY 136 (2001); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 136-67 (1997) (discussing the use
of "color as a proxy for dangerousness.")
12. Devah Pager and Bruce Western, Barriers to Employment Facing Young Black and White Men
with Criminal Records (2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at www.princeton.edu/pager/
auditnycoffendersdraft.pdf).
13. Id. The positive response rates for white non-offenders, white ex-offenders, black non-offenders,
and black ex-offenders were: 20.7%, 13.9%, 20.9%, and 9%, respectively.
14. Id. at 6. See also Pager, supra note 7 at 645 (finding similar results based on a study of employer
callback rates in Milwaukee, Wisconsin).
15. See Loic Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, 3 PUNISHMENT &
Soc'Y 95, 119-21 (2005).
16. See generally Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT 15 (Marc Mauer and Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
17. See Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153 (1999).
18. See, e.g., Gabriel Chin, Race, the War on Drugs and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253 (2002) (stating, "The real sentence comes like a ton of bricks
in the form of a series of statutes denying convicted felons a variety of rights .... The ton of bricks is
invisible.").
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communities who depend on them for financial support. 19
Nevertheless, the laws of the vast majority of states are silent when it comes to
employment discrimination against individuals with criminal records. In forty-
two states, the sole restriction on the extent to which employers can take criminal
records into account when making employment decisions is found in Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, which forbids employment practices that have a disparate
impact on a group of a specific race, religion, sex, or national origin when those
practices are not "job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity.' '20 A number of challenges to employment practices related to
ex-offenders under a disparate impact theory have argued that the denial of
employment opportunities to individuals with criminal records has a disparate
impact on African Americans and Latinos. 2' However, successful disparate
impact challenges relating to criminal records and employment are exceedingly
rare today; there has not been one upheld by a Federal Appeals Court since
1975.22
Currently, one can find the most meaningful legal protections for ex-offenders
in the job market in the laws of the eight states that explicitly restrict the extent to
which employers can use criminal records in decision-making.23 The most
progressive of these laws is New York State's Article 23A, passed in 1976, under
which an employer may only deny an employment opportunity as a result of a
criminal conviction when (1) there is a "direct relationship" between the past
conviction and the duties of employment or (2) the applicant's criminal history
indicates that employing him or her would constitute an "unreasonable risk" to
public safety. An employer considering an applicant's criminal record is required
to take into account a series of factors, including the individual circumstances
surrounding the conviction and any evidence of rehabilitation, before applying
either of the exceptions above.24
However, as I demonstrate below, New York State courts have diluted the
language of Article 23A mandating fair consideration of ex-offenders by
consistently deferring to employer decisions to turn away applicants with
19. See Bruce Western, Becky Pettit and Josh Guetzkow, Black Economic Progress in the Era of Mass
Imprisonment, in INViSIBLE PuNIsHmENT 165 (Marc Mauer and Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); see also
Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45 B.C. L. REv. 255,
259-62 (2004).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2005).
21. See Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 523 F.2d 1290, 1295-98 (8th Cir. 1975)
(upholding claim of disparate impact on African-Americans of employment policy that excluded from
consideration all applicants with criminal convictions other than traffic offenses).
22. See Part II.B, infra.
23. The eight states are Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-80 (2005); HAw. REv. STAT. § 378-2.5 (2003);
775 ILL. CoMe. STAT. 5/2-103 (2005); MAsS. GEN. LAWS Ch, 151B, § 4(9) (2005); MIN STAT. § 364.03
(2005); N.Y. CoRREc-r. LAW §§ 750-755 (McKimnney 2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §9125 (2005); Wisc.
STAT. § 111.335 (2005).
24. N.Y. CoRREcT. LAW §§ 750-755 (McKinney 2005).
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criminal records.2 5 The New York State Court of Appeals has allowed employers
to connect tangential elements of a crime (e.g., dishonesty) to general require-
ments of employment (e.g., self-control) in finding a direct relationship between
a past crime and an employment opportunity,26 and has given employers virtually
limitless discretion in deciding that hiring an ex-offender would pose an
"unreasonable risk" to public safety.27 The Court's interpretations of Article 23A
are inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute, reflecting an unwillingness
to endorse the hiring of ex-offenders when faced with employers making
seemingly understandable--or "rational"--decisions. In applying Article 23A to
individual employment situations, the New York State Court of Appeals has
focused on the rationality of individual decisions as they relate to limited notions
of the amount of "risk" and "cost" borne by employers rather than on the risks
and costs to society as a whole of failing to encourage, within reason, the
employment of ex-offenders. The Court of Appeals decided the key cases
interpreting Article 23A between the years 1988 and 2002, a period that directly
coincided with the sharpest increase in rates of incarceration in American
history.28 As David Garland has observed, this prison boom was partially a result
of criminal justice policies that rejected the penal-welfarism 29 of the mid-20th
century in favor of an "economic" style of reasoning, in which the language of
risks and costs was used to justify increasingly punitive sentences. 30 Garland has
argued that, "This increasingly influential rationality ... helped to change how
the system thinks about crime and criminals-encouraging a more costed
conception of social harm and a conception of the offender that emphasizes
rational choice and calculation., 31 By deferring to employers in their rejection of
job applicants with criminal records, the Court's decisions reflect the political
landscape of the late 20th century.
Ultimately, the history of federal employment discrimination law demonstrates
that, if statutory reforms are to be successful, they must provide a "rational"
justification for the protections they offer and a normative basis upon which
courts can feel comfortable relying.32 In this paper, I argue that in order to
promote the employment of ex-offenders under anti-discrimination legislation on
the state level (and specifically in New York), it is necessary both to rethink the
25. See Part II, infra.
26. See Al Turi Landfill, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 751 N.Y.S.2d 827, 829
(N.Y. 2002).
27. See, e.g., Arrocha v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, 93 N.Y2d 361, 365 (N.Y 1999).
28. MAUER, supra note 10, at 20.
29. Garland defines penal-welfarism as a conception that "combin[es] the liberal legalism of the due
process and proportionate punishment with a correctionalist commitment to rehabilitation, welfare and
criminological expertise." GARLAND, supra note 11, at 27.
30. See id. at 166-92. Garland writes, "[Ploliticians often speak the language of risk only to
bowdlerize its terms and confound its logic. If it relates to the release of a convicted offender, then any
level of risk is unacceptable." Id. at 192.
31. Id.
32. See Parts MI and IV, infra.
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concept of "rationality" as it relates to the employment of ex-offenders and to
extend reforms to include efforts to change normative perceptions of the role of
ex-offenders in mainstream society. President Bush's 2004 State of the Union
address indicates a real possibility that, as hundreds of thousands of additional
ex-offenders rejoin their communities each year, we can hope to see political,
economic, and cultural shifts in the attitudes of Americans towards individuals
with criminal records. Statutory reforms should seek to reinforce these shifts by
underscoring the overall benefit to society and to the economy when the law
assists ex-offenders in becoming healthy and productive members of society.
In Part II, I present an analysis of the concept of "rationality" in federal
employment discrimination law, specifically focusing on the implications of the
concept of rational discrimination on efforts to increase employment opportuni-
ties for ex-offenders. Part III then presents a case study of New York's Article
23A and suggests that statutory language alone is not enough to protect
ex-offenders from employment discrimination. Even in New York, where the
state legislature explicitly instructed employers to hire individuals with criminal
records when such employment decisions are consistent with public safety, the
state's courts have bowed to a limited conception of rational decision-making and
virtually negated the impact of the law. Based on these phenomena, Part IV
suggests a model for reform that seeks to rethink the reigning models of
rationality and morality as they relate to the employment of ex-offenders in
America.
II. RATIONALITY AND MoRALITY IN FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
A. Rational v. Irrational Discrimination
An examination of the how the concept of "rational discrimination" operates in
federal antidiscrimination law underscores the challenges faced by any legal
scheme designed to protect ex-offenders from discrimination in the workplace.
The reigning legal standards of employment discrimination rest on a difference
between decisions based on assumptions about individuals because of their
membership in protected groups, and "rational" discrimination, or behavior on
the part of employers that seems justified because of real or perceived differences
between individuals in the labor market. This distinction is guided by an interest
in minimizing costs; when bias towards a protected group causes an employer to
act against its economic self-interest, then antidiscrimination law intervenes.33 A
focus on eliminating only "irrational" employment decisions becomes especially
problematic for policies aimed at protecting ex-offenders. In the context of
criminal records, to which an acknowledged association with "risk" attaches at
33. But see RIcHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION LAWS 20-58 (1992) (arguing that free market forces should eliminate most inefficient discrimination
without the help of antidiscrimination laws).
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the point of conviction,34 courts are hesitant to discredit employer defenses that
rely on traditional notions of cost and efficiency.
For example, one can locate the equation of irrational discrimination with
inefficient employment practices in the justifications for and judicial enforcement
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).35 Upon the passage of
the ADEA in 1967, President Johnson noted, "Hundreds of thousands of not yet
old, not yet voluntarily retired, find themselves jobless because of arbitrary age
discrimination .... In economic terms, this is a serious-and senseless-loss to
a nation on the move."3 6 A central underlying rationale for the ADEA is thus an
interest in maximizing economic opportunity.
The Supreme Court seized upon this notion of rationality in its interpretation of
the ADEA. In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, the Court considered a claim that
Hazen Paper had violated the ADEA by firing the plaintiff in order to prevent his
pension benefits from vesting.37 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion locates the
purpose of the ADEA as the prevention of decisions based on incorrect
assumptions regarding "productivity and competence," stating that the action of
firing an employee because their pension will soon vest, "would not be the result
of an inaccurate and denigrating generalization about age, but would rather
represent an accurate judgment about the employee-that he indeed is 'close to
vesting."' 3 8 By separating pension status from age,39 O'Connor is able to validate
an employer policy motivated by a rational interest in saving money. As Parts
II.B and II.C below will demonstrate, this focus on protecting efficient business
practices is equally present in the Court's treatment of disparate impact doctrine
and its interpretation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Considerations of rationality depend upon a court's willingness to acknowl-
edge the risks posed by the hiring of members from a range of protected groups.
Michael Stein has envisioned a "continuum of perceived biological difference" in
antidiscrimination law, in which courts are less willing to acknowledge differ-
ences between different races than between genders, and between genders than
with respect to the disabled.40 The result is that courts are more likely to
recognize the economic justifications of employer practices when it comes to
groups, like the disabled, at the far end of this continuum. 41 With race, courts are
34. The formal stigma following a criminal conviction begins with the presumption that an individual
has displayed a disregard for the law and an inability to follow rules.
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2005).
36. 113 CONG. REc. 1089-90 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1967) (statement of Pres. Lyndon Johnson, Aidfor the
Aged).
37. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
38. Id. at 612.
39. O'Connor writes, "[A]n employee's age is analytically distinct from his years of service." Id. at
611.
40. Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations asAntidiscrimi-
nation, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 579, 622 (2004).
41. For a discussion of the concept of "irrational discrimination" as it relates to the Americans with
Disabilities Act, see Part II.C, infra.
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justifiably hesitant to openly acknowledge any difference at all. The only defense
available to employers in relation to racial groups under the individual and
disparate treatment doctrines is to rebut the plaintiff's alleged evidence of
discriminatory intent.42 In contrast, under § 703(e) of Title VII, the defense of
"Bona Fide Occupational Qualification" is available to employers for the
categories of religion, sex and national origin. In Dothard v. Rawlinson, for
example, the Supreme Court cited differences between genders in upholding an
Alabama rule requiring prison guards to be the same gender as prisoners.43 The
Court stated, "A woman's relative ability to maintain order in a male,
maximum-security, unclassified penitentiary... could be directly reduced by her
womanhood." 44 Age falls even further along this spectrum; the ADEA allows for
two additional defenses to practices that discriminate based on age-(1) for
"good cause" and (2) for "reasonable factors other than age."45
If race is at one end of the spectrum, representing an immutable characteristic
that employers may not legally consider as a proxy for other qualifications, then a
criminal record lies at the other end of that continuum. Many view a criminal
record as a result of choice, reflecting incompetence and immorality.46 This
distinguishes ex-offenders from groups representing immutable characteristics
such as race, gender, and age. One commentator has argued that statutes like
Article 23A that provide legal protections for ex-offenders in the workplace
"protect[] a class unworthy of being rewarded with such extra protection. 47
There is therefore a sense that laws which restrict the freedom of employers to
reject applicants with criminal records favor individuals who have made bad
choices over employers who are making sensible judgments based on those past
bad acts. Accordingly, employment decisions that exclude ex-offenders from the
workplace are seen as "rational" and morally appropriate despite any impact they
may have on other protected groups.
B. Rationality in Disparate Impact:
Why a Race-Based Claim Fails in the Context of Criminal Convictions
Employment discrimination claims based upon the disparate impact on racial
minorities of employment policies that discriminate against ex-offenders face
similar "rationality" roadblocks in federal court. While disparate impact doctrine
focuses on the inadvertent effects of employer policies rather than on intent, the
doctrine nevertheless reflects an underlying interest in eliminating irrational
42. See 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2003).
43. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
44. Id. at 336.
45. 29 U.S.C.S. §623(f)(3) (2005), §§4(f)(1) and 4(f)(3).
46. See, e.g., Thomas M. Hruz, Comment, The Unwisdom of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act's
Ban of Employment Discrimination on the Basis of a Conviction Records, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 779 (2002).
47. Id. at 820.
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discrimination and protecting rational employment practices. An employer's
available affirmative defense to a claim of disparate impact under Title VII-that
of "business necessity" and "job relatedness"-indicates that the purpose of the
doctrine is to force an employer to make changes to its hiring policies only when
such changes are also in the employer's economic self-interest. In addressing
disparate impact claims, the Supreme Court has been swayed by concerns with
safety, efficiency, and reasonableness, all of which have been found to trump
impact.4a The Court has also displayed a willingness to defer to employer
practices that single out "risky" populations, like ex-addicts and ex-offenders,
when the court sees membership in excluded groups as reflective of immoral
choices. 49 Thus, although employment discrimination against ex-offenders
disproportionately affects African American and Latino job applicants, the
rational and moral concerns underlying Title VII's disparate impact doctrine
make impact claims exceedingly difficult to win in the context of criminal
convictions.
Successful disparate impact claims on behalf of ex-offenders are not impos-
sible. In the 1970s, at least two federal appeals courts ruled that employee
practices that automatically eliminate candidates based on the existence of a
criminal record are unconstitutional when those practices have a disparate impact
on African Americans. ° In Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, the
Eight Circuit upheld a disparate impact claim against Missouri Pacific, which
followed a policy of denying employment to all applicants who had ever been
convicted of a crime other than a traffic offense.5' The court held that such a
policy was too broad to justify its effects on African American applicants, who
were rejected at a rate 2.5 times that of White applicants. 2 The majority wrote,
"[A] sweeping disqualification for employment resting solely on past behavior
can violate Title VII where that employment practice has a disproportionate
racial impact and rests upon a tenuous or insubstantial basis... To deny job
opportunities to these individuals because of some conduct which may be
remote in time or does not substantially bear upon the particular job
requirements is an unnecessarily harsh and unjust burden."53
The Eighth Circuit thus connects its finding of disparate impact to a normative
argument relying on the injustice of excluding ex-offenders from job opportuni-
ties without considering the individual qualifications of each applicant.
48. See New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979) (acknowledging the
"legitimate employment goals of safety and efficiency" in assessing job-relatedness).
49. See Parts II.B and II.C., infra.
50. Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); Gregory v. Litton
Systems, Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
51. 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
52. Id. at 1295.
53. Id. 1296-98.
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While Green still stands as good law (and notably echoes the language of
Article 23A, passed one year later in New York), the Supreme Court's 1978
decision in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer signaled a significant
setback for any disparate impact claim on behalf of ex-offenders in federal
court.54 In Beazer, the Court held that a Transit Authority (TA) policy generally
denying employment to methadone users did not violate Title VII even though
the policy resulted in the exclusion of significantly more African American and
Latino applicants than white applicants.55 In addition to holding that the plaintiffs
had not met the statistical burden required to make out a case of disparate impact,
the Beazer court noted in dicta that the TA's case would have also stood up under
a defense of job-relatedness given the public safety requirements of the job,
saying, "TA's legitimate employment goals of safety and efficiency require the
exclusion of all users of illegal narcotics. . . and of a majority of all methadone
users."5 6 The Court had no problem recognizing a business necessity defense
when the employer cited its rational interest in protecting public safety. Indeed,
courts have tended to defer to employers when public safety is cited as a
consideration in decision-making. In Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority, the Supreme Court, referring to the Tenth Circuit's
1972 decision in Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., stated that, "the [business
necessity] standard itself takes public safety into consideration .... [A] showing
[that not considering the criterion in question significantly jeopardizes public
safety] would be relevant to determine if that [criterion] is necessary for the
successful performance of the job. 57
The decision in Beazer also belies the Supreme Court's resistance to applying
Title VII's protections to the benefit of former drug addicts. The majority's
opinion focuses on the statistical burden of proof, finding that the plaintiff's
demonstration-that 81% of employees referred for suspect violations of TA's
narcotics rule and 63% of people receiving methadone maintenance treatment in
public programs in New York City were African American or Latino-was not
enough to prove the disparate impact of TA's policies.58 Underlying the Court's
rejection of such strong evidence one senses a manifest unwillingness to believe
that the law should require employers to treat ex-addicts as they would other
potential employees. Justice White argues in the Beazer dissent that plaintiffs
clearly made out a prima facie case of disparate impact; he also notes that
"[p]etitioners had every opportunity, but presented nothing to negative the
employability of successfully maintained methadone users as distinguished from
those who were unsuccessful. Instead, petitioners, like the Court, dwell on the
methadone failures-those who quit the programs or who remain but turn to
54. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
55. Id. at 584.
56. Id. at 587.
57. 181 .3d 478, 483 (1999), citing 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
58. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 569.
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illicit drug use.",5 9 White's dissent recognizes the unfairness of calculations of
risk based only on past illicit conduct. White implies that in making its statistical
assessments, the majority also reflected its assumptions about the "rational"
nature of excluding ex-addicts from employment opportunities. The Beazer
decision thus validates precisely what the Green court condemned as unjust in the
context of criminal convictions: the automatic elimination of an application for
employment based on the applicant's past conduct and without considering her
other qualifications.
Since the time of the Court's decision in Beazer, and despite the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the strength of disparate impact doctrine has
significantly diminished. 60 While the doctrine is still alive,61 the Court's
deference to employer practices seen as safe and efficient, especially in the
context of past illegal behavior, indicates that a challenge to employer practices
that take criminal convictions into account under Title VII's disparate impact
doctrine would not hold much promise in a court today. This is true despite the
fact that African Americans are represented in the ex-offender population even
more disproportionately than they were when Green was decided in 1975.62
While disparate impact may not prove immediately useful in an effort to
improve opportunities for ex-offenders, the Supreme Court's treatment of public
safety considerations in the disparate impact context remains relevant to a
strategy of reducing discrimination against ex-offenders through statutory reform
at any level. Decisions such as Beazer highlight attitudes regarding the
relationship between past drug use and future public safety that cannot be ignored
if one hopes to promote the hiring of individuals with criminal records. Indeed,
the success of future reforms depends the ability of reformers to undermine
"rational" arguments like those found in the Beazer majority by raising the
awareness of the importance of providing individuals released from prison with
adequate support. Nor should reform strategies ignore the fact that the faces of
these individuals tend to be African American and Latino. Instead, normative
justifications for proposed reforms should emphasize the impact that current
policies have on minority communities.63
C. Rationality in Disparate Treatment: The Example of the ADA
Judicial interpretation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)
over the past fifteen years further underscores the insistence of courts on
59. Id. at 1376 (discussing plaintiff's equal protection claims).
60. See Nicole J. DeSario, Note, Reconceptualizing Meritocracy: The Decline of Disparate Impact, 38
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 479, 493-500 (2003) (describing the decline of disparate impact after Beazer).
61. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (upholding disparate impact under the ADEA).
62. See MIClAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 49 (1995).
63. See R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 803 (2004) (arguing that policies that increase stigmas associated with marginalized racial groups
should be challenged for the disparate impact that they have on minorities).
No. 21
The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy
deferring to employer practices that seem justified by economic considerations.
By requiring employers to provide "reasonable accommodations" to disabled
employees, 64 the ADA is the first federal antidiscrimination statute to explicitly
limit behavior considered "rational." Under the ADA, it is not enough for
employers to treat individuals with disabilities as they would other employees; if
disabled employees require reasonable accommodations to perform their jobs,
employers must treat them differently. Underlying the ADA mandate of
"reasonable accommodation" is a sense that the purpose of the statute is to
eliminate costly discrimination against individuals with disabilities-costly both
to those discriminated against and to the United States government, which must
otherwise provide for those individuals when they are unemployed. The ADA's
remedy is to shift these costs to the employer.65 A number of scholars have argued
that this emphasis on limiting "rational" discrimination by moving people into
the workforce who would not be there if employers were allowed to act in their
own self-interests has led federal courts to severely restrict the coverage of the
ADA.66 For example, Linda Kreiger has argued that the narrow coverage of the
ADA as interpreted by the courts can be partially attributed to the fact that "large
segments of the public, including many judges and media programmers,
completely fail to understand.., that the ADA... is an anti-discrimination
statute, not a social welfare benefits program. 67
One can see this resistance to the limits that the ADA places on the ability of
employers to act "rationally" in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
statute's "reasonable accommodation" requirement. In U.S. Airways v. Barnett,
the Court held that a plaintiff's request to remain in the mailroom because of his
injured back did not constitute a "reasonable accommodation" when his
employer was trying to adhere to its seniority system.68 Justice Breyer's majority
opinion states that in rebutting a plaintiff's claim that a requested accommodation
is reasonable, "the employer's showing of a violation of the rules of a seniority
system is by itself ordinarily sufficient., 69 While the Court's holding in Barnett is
restricted to seniority systems, Breyer's opinion limits the meaning of "reason-
able accommodations" in all circumstances by deferring to what the Court sees as
an efficient business model. Breyer writes that the purpose of "reasonable
accommodations" is to help "those with disabilities to obtain the same workplace
64. 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)(A) (2005).
65. For a critique of the rationality of this remedy, see Scott A. Moss and Daniel A. Malin, Public
Funding for Disability Accommodations: A Rational Solution to Rational Discrimination and the
Disabilities oftheADA, 33 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 197 (1998).
66. Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARv. L. REv. 643 (2001); Stein,
supra note 40; Sam Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform. 44 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 921 (2003).
67. Linda Kreiger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 476,516(2000).
68. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
69. Id. at 403.
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opportunities that those without disabilities automatically enjoy."'70 The implica-
tion is that the ADA should promote equal, but not preferential, treatment of the
disabled. When requests for accommodation from disabled employees clash with
profit-maximizing business practices, those "rational" practices triumph.
Federal courts have also displayed opposition to the ADA's limitations on "rational"
discrimination in their limited interpretation of the definition of "disability" under the
statute. In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, decided the same
year as Bamett, the Supreme Court held that in determining the definition of "major life
activity 71 under the ADA, "the central inquiry must be whether the claimant is unable
to perform the variety of tasks central to most people's daily lives, not whether the
claimant is unable to perform the tasks associated with her specific job.' 72 In holding
that an individual whose work injuries resulted in an inability to lift heavy objects or
engage in repetitive manual labor was not covered by this definition,73 the Court
displayed an interest in limiting the coverage of the ADA to protections for the severely
disabled. This exceedingly narrow definition of disability is also reflected in the
treatment by federal courts of the ADA's exclusion of people "currently engag[ing] in
the illegal use of drugs."74 In Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd., the Fifth Circuit
held that the employer acted legally when it terminated the plaintiff for his use of drugs
despite a promise that he could keep his job if he completed a rehabilitation program.75
In holding that the definition of "current" drug user extends to an individual using drugs
at the time when an employer begins to consider termination rather than on the date she
is fired, the court stated, "Columbia was carrying out its rational and legally sound
decision not to employ illegal cocaine users in its hospital pharmacy."7
6
In short, the limits that federal courts have placed on the applicability of the
ADA can be attributed to an overarching conception, despite statutory language
to the contrary, of a law whose purpose is to protect "irrational" discrimination.
This focus on irrationality is equally troublesome when one turns to statutes
aimed at improving employment opportunities for ex-offenders. Many individual
decisions to pass over ex-offenders in favor of employing people without
criminal records are based on reasonable fears of risks to workplace safety and to
employer liability. Individuals with criminal records do commit new crimes at
higher rates than individuals without records,77 and employers are often held
70. Id. at 397.
71. Section 3(2) of the ADA defines a "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of... [an] individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C.S. § 12102(2) (2005).
72. 534 U.S. 182 (2002).
73. Id.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 12104 (2005).
75. 176 F.3d 847 (5th Cir. 1999).
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. PATRICK LANGAN & DAVID LEVIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
RECIDVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, NCJ 193427 (2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf.
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liable when their employees commit crimes while on the job.78 The thinking of
the Fifth Circuit in Zenor reflects the resulting hesitancy to question employer
decisions related to criminal activity, as do the decisions by the New York State
Court of Appeals granting employers broad discretion under Article 23A. As long
as this limited conception of rationality guides the decisions of employers and the
judgments of courts, reducing barriers to employment for ex-offenders will
remain an unrealistic goal of antidiscrimination law.
Decisions limiting the coverage of the ADA reflect an additional obstacle faced
by statutes intended to promote the hiring of ex-offenders-that of convincing
judges and the public that individuals with criminal records deserve full
consideration in employment decisions. In addition to an insistence on deferring
to efficiency and rationality, federal courts interpreting the ADA have displayed
an interest in distinguishing between individuals with disabilities seen as worthy
of protection and those seen as undeserving. In Despears v. Milwaukee County,
the Seventh Circuit held that discharging an employee for actions related to
alcoholism does not constitute unlawful discrimination under the ADA.7 9 Judge
Posner wrote for the court that ruling otherwise "would give alcoholics and other
diseased or disabled persons a privilege to avoid some of the normal sanctions for
criminal activity.",80 Despears reflects a resistance to extending the protections of
the ADA to individuals whose choices have contributed to their disabilities.
Because employers and the public often view a criminal record as reflective of
immoral choices-and by extension deserving of discrimination-reforms aimed
at increasing employment opportunities for ex-offenders must seek to transform
both the "rational" and the moral dimensions of judicial decision-making.
III. NEW YORK'S ARTICLE 23A
A. The Law in Detail
The New York State Legislature passed Article 23A in 1976, partly in
recognition of the limits of federal antidiscrimination law in protecting ex-
offenders from discrimination. 81 The first statute of its kind-and to this day the
most progressive 82-- Article 23A forbids employers from imposing blanket
78. See Leroy D. Clark, A Civil Rights Task: Removing Barriers to Employment of Ex-Convicts, 83
U.S.F. L. REv. 193 (2004).
79. 63 F3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995).
80. Id.
81. Michael Meltsner and others drafted a model act in the early 1970s, and thanks to work of the
Legal Action Center and the fortuitous sponsorship of the bill by a Republican State Senator from Long
Island, the state legislature passed the law in 1976. For an early version of the bill, see Michael Meltsner,
Marc Caplan, & William C. Lane, An Act to Promote the Rehabilitation of Criminal Offenders in the State
of New York, 24 SYRACUSE L. REv. 885 (1973). See Bonacorsa v. Van Lindt, 71 N.Y2d 605, 611 (N.Y
1988), citing Meltsner et al., supra, and 1976 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN., at 50.
82. Only seven other states have laws prohibiting employment discrimination based on conviction
records. Of these, a number of scholars point to New York's law as the most effective at increasing
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rejections of individuals with criminal records and requires employment
decisions based on all of an applicant's qualifications. However, Article 23A has
met the same fate as the ADA on the federal level: despite strong statutory
language to the contrary, New York courts have repeatedly deferred to what they
see as "rational" preferences of individual employers.8 3 An examination of the
statutory language and the ways it has been interpreted in the thirty years of the
law's existence provide a potent example of the ways in which courts can
interpret laws to conform to their own limited conceptions of "rationality."
On its face, Article 23A encourages employers to hire individuals with
criminal records. According to the language of the law, rather than assume that
applicants with criminal records "lack ... good moral character" and are
therefore unemployable, employers must engage in a contextual evaluation of the
impact of an applicant's criminal history on her ability to perform a specific job
and any risk she may pose to others in performing that job. 4 An employer may
only deny an application for license or employment based on a criminal
conviction when (1) there is a direct relationship between the criminal conviction
and the duties of employment or (2) the applicant's criminal history indicates that
employing her "would involve an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety or
welfare of specific individuals or the general public. 85
Correction Law § 753(1) requires employers to consider the following eight
factors surrounding a conviction when applying the exceptions above:
(a) The public policy of this state, as expressed in this act, to encourage the
licensure and employment of persons previously convicted of one or more
criminal offenses.
(b) The specific duties and responsibilities necessarily related to the license or
employment sought.
(c) The bearing, if any, the criminal offense or offenses for which the person
was previously convicted will have on his fitness or ability to perform one
or more of such duties or responsibilities.
(d) The time which has elapsed since the occurrence of the criminal offense or
offenses.
(e) The age of the person at the time of occurrence of the criminal offense or
offenses.
employment opportunities for ex-offenders. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 78, at 208-10; Jennifer Leavitt,
Note, Walking a Tightrope: Balancing Competing Public Interests In the Employment of Criminal
Offenders, 24 CONN. L. REV. 1281 (2002).
83. I am certainly not the first person to recognize the limited impact of Article 23A on ex-offenders
seeking employment in New York. As one Legal Aid attorney has written of the protections of Article
23A, "[Tihese rights are often very hollow and rarely enforced." Michael Barbosa, Lawyering at the
Margins, 11 Am. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 135, 140 (2002).
84. N.Y. CoRREcT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 2005).
85. Id.
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(f) The seriousness of the offense or offenses.
(g) Any information produced by the person, or produced on his behalf, in
regard to his rehabilitation and good conduct.
(h) The legitimate interest of the public agency or private employer in
protecting property, and the safety and welfare of specific individuals or
the general public.86
Section 753(2) states that, in making a determination under § 752, an employer
or agency "shall also give consideration to a certificate of relief from disabilities
or a certificate of good conduct issued to the applicant, which certificate shall
create a presumption of rehabilitation in regard to the offense or offenses
specified therein."87 Article 23A thus seeks to balance the interest of employers in
creating a safe workplace with a public policy encouraging the hiring of
ex-offenders. The law requires a contextual evaluation of an individual's
qualifications for the position in question and ability to perform the duties of
employment without exposing others to undue risk in the workplace.
B. The Law in Context
New York is one of only eight states with a law explicitly limiting the extent to
which employers can consider criminal convictions in making employment
decisions.88 Of the seven other states, only the laws of Hawaii, Illinois,
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin apply to all convictions and all forms of employ-
ment.89 Article 23A differs from the other state laws in two significant ways: (1) it
is the only state law to require that employers explicitly consider a list of factors
that place a conviction in an individualized context, and (2) it is the only law to
provide a public safety exception, allowing employers to reject an applicant not
only when there is a "direct relationship" between the offense and the job, but
also when her criminal record indicates that she would present an "unreasonable"
public safety risk.90
While this second difference affords employers in New York more discretion
86. N.Y. CoRREcr. LAW § 753(1) (McKinney 2005).
87. N.Y. CoRREcr. LAW § 753(2) (McKinney 2005). Any individual denied employment or a license
as a result of a criminal conviction has a right to request a written statement setting forth the reasons for
the denial, and the employer or agency must provide such a statement within thirty days of the request.
N.Y. CoRREcT. LAW § 754 (McKinney 2005). While there is no right to a public hearing, an individual
wishing to appeal a denial of employment based on her criminal record may do so through the State
Division of Human Rights if the action was by a private employer, and through an Article 78 proceeding
if the action was by a public agency. N.Y. CoRREcr. LAW § 755 (McKinney 2005).
88. See note 23, supra, and accompanying text.
89. HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5 (2003); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-103 (2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 9125 (2005); Wisc. STAT. § 111.335 (2005). Connecticut and Minnesota's laws refer only to public
employers, and Massachusetts' law applies only to convictions for misdemeanors. CoNN. GEr. STAT.
§ 46a-80 (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 151B, § 4(9) (2005); MtRN STAT. § 364.03 (2005).
90. N.Y. CoRRECT. LAW §752.
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in denying employment opportunities to ex-offenders, 9 ' it is the "factor-based"
approach that makes Article 23A a uniquely progressive law. Article 23A requires
an employer considering an applicant's criminal record to take into account a
series of factors, including the individual circumstances surrounding the convic-
tion, before denying an application under either the "direct relationship" or
"unreasonable risk" exceptions.92 This approach renders Article 23A exceptional
when compared to other state laws, under which employers simply compare the
type of conviction to the duties of employment. This difference is best illustrated
by the approach taken in Wisconsin, where the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
interpreted the state's comparable "substantial relation" test to forbid "a detailed
inquiry into the facts of the offense and the job,, 93 and the Wisconsin Labor and
Industry Review Commission has held that mitigating circumstances, evidence
of rehabilitation, formal pardons and the amount of time elapsed since a
conviction (all relevant factors under § 753 of New York's Article 23A) are
irrelevant to an employer's finding of a substantial relationship between a
conviction and the duties of a job.94
Unlike other states, however, New York has no mechanism for the elimination
of an individual's criminal record as a consideration in employment decisions.
For example, in Hawaii no employer can consider a conviction that is more than
ten years old.95 New York has no time beyond which employers cannot consider a
conviction, although employers must take into account "the time which has
elapsed since the occurrence of the criminal offense" as one of the factors in any
decision to deny an employment opportunity.96 Moreover, in New York there is
no means for a fully rehabilitated ex-offender to ensure that her conviction will
not present a barrier to an employment position for which she is otherwise
qualified. In Illinois, employers cannot use sealed or expunged records in
employment decisions.9 7 New Yorkers have no way of sealing records from
employers; instead, individuals can apply for certificates of rehabilitation that, as
detailed below, do not have much legal bite in the context of hiring decisions.98
In addition to these differences in statutory language, New York courts
interpreting Article 23A in the past thirty years have significantly weakened the
impact of the law's existing language, with the effect that some discrimination
91. See Part II.B, infra.
92. See N.Y. CoRRECT. LAW §§ 750-755.
93. County of Milwaukee v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 908, 915 (Wis. 1987),
94. See, e.g., Nelson v. Prudential Ins. Co., ERD Case No. 9401290 (L1RC May 17, 1996). See also
Hruz, supra note 46, at 794-797.
95. HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5 (2003).
96. N.Y. CoRREcr. LAW § 753(1)(d). Notably, New York's model act prohibited the consideration of
all felony convictions older than seven years, and all misdemeanor convictions older than three. Meltsner
et. al., supra note 77 at 906. See also Bonacorsa v. Van Lindt, 71 N.Y.2d 605,611 (N.Y. 1988) (citing the
statute and accompanying article written by Meltsner et. al. as an indication of the New York legislature's
intent in passing the law).
97. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-103 (2005).
98. See Part III.C, infra.
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against ex-offenders in the employment context remains legal in New York. Like
federal courts, the New York State Court of Appeals and the state's lower courts
have deferred to a concept of rationality that contradicts the mandates of the Act.
Rather than adhere to the specific balancing tests articulated by the law, New
York's courts have allowed employers to craft their own definitions of "unreason-
able risk" and "direct relationship." These standards conform to pre-existing
assumptions about the risks posed by individuals with criminal records,
regardless of evidence of rehabilitation or other indications to the contrary, and
legitimate short-sighted decision-making that undermines the state's interest in
promoting the employment of ex-offenders.
C. New York State Courts and Article 23A
1. Direct Relationship
The New York State Court of Appeals interprets Article 23A's "direct
relationship" exception very broadly, allowing employers to draw tangential
connections between convictions and the duties of employment. Section 750 of
the law defines a "direct relationship" as a situation in which "the nature of
criminal conduct for which the person was convicted has a direct bearing on his
fitness or ability to perform one or more of the duties or responsibilities
necessarily related to the license or employment sought."99 The Court of Appeals
interprets this to mean that a direct relationship can exist not only when the
offense in question is clearly related to the industry or occupation at issue, but
also when the elements inherent in the nature of the offense are tangentially
related to the duties of the license or employment sought. 00 In Al Turi Landfill,
Inc. v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, the Court of
Appeals upheld the denial of a license to expand a landfill based on the
applicant's prior convictions for federal tax-related crimes.101 The court con-
cluded that the agency's decision was "rational," using the word four times in less
than two pages.10 2 The court found that "dishonesty, lack of integrity in
conducting business, and.., willingness to mislead the government" were
inherent in the convictions of the tax-related crimes and therefore directly related
to the duties of the license such as "accurate record keeping" and "effective
self-policing."1 3
Such an interpretation gives employers broad leeway to reject applicants. It is
hard to imagine a criminal offense for which an argument could not be made that
the offender displayed a "lack of integrity," and a job for which "effective
self-policing" is not a necessary requirement. The drafters of New York's model
99. N.Y. CoP.REcr. LAW §750 (emphasis added).
100. Al Turi Landfill, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 751 N.YS.2d 827, 829
(N.Y 2002).
101. Id. at 828.
102. Id. at 828-29.
103. Id. at 829.
[Vol. XIII
Rethinking "Rational Discrimination"
act recommended that the direct relationship test "require[] a substantial and
immediate connection between the crime and the functions and responsibilities
which pertain to the particular right or opportunity."'"° While the "direct
relationship" standard articulated by the New York State Court of Appeals
mirrors those found in other states with similar statutes,10 5 it is nevertheless
excessively broad given the ease with which one can draw connections between
the elements of a crime-e.g., "dishonesty" or "untrustworthiness"-and the
requirements of most types of employment.' 0 6 The New York State Court of
Appeals' standard reverts the law back to where it began before the passage of
Article 23A: a blanket assumption that a criminal conviction is the mark of a
weak candidate for employment.
2. Unreasonable Risk
Similarly, the New York State Court of Appeals has deferred to employers'
conceptions of rational decision-making in interpreting the "unreasonable risk"
prong of the statute. The court has held that employers must explicitly take into
account each of the eight factors listed in § 753 when determining that granting
an offer of employment or a license would present "an unreasonable risk to
property or to the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general public"
under § 753(2).107 However, in practice, New York courts grant employers a large
104. Meltsner et al., supra note 81, at 903.
105. Article 23A's "direct relationship" test mirrors the language found in the statutes of Wisconsin,
Hawaii, and Pennsylvania, which provide that a criminal conviction can only bar an individual from
employment when that conviction has a "rational" (Hawaii) or "substantial" (Wisconsin) relationship to
the duties of employment. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5
(2003); Wisc. STAT. § 111.335 (2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9125. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
has held that employers can meet the state's "substantial relation" test by "ascertaining relevant, general,
character-related circumstances of the offense or job." County of Milwaukee v. Labor and Indus. Review
Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 908, 916 (Wis. 1987).
106. Despite this expansive interpretation, New York courts do prohibit the denial of an employment
opportunity under the "direct relationship" test when there are clearly no elements of a conviction that
can be said to relate to the duties of employment. For example, the Southern District of New York has
held that there is not a direct relationship between maintenance work in public housing developments and
a prior manslaughter conviction because the nature and duties of the job would not require an employee
to confront violent situations. Soto-Lopez v. New York City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 713 F. Supp 677, 678
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). And, when an employer or agency finds that a direct relationship does exist between the
conviction and the employment sought, the employer must still consider each of the factors listed in
§753 and determine whether, at its discretion, the license or employment should be issued. Bonacorsa v.
Van Lindt, 71 N.Y.2d 605,613 (N.Y. 1988).
107. Bonacorsa, 71 N.Y.2d at 613. In Bonacorsa, the Court of Appeals held that the New York State
Racing and Wagering Board did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's application for a new
license as an owner-trainer-driver of harness race horses based on the "direct relationship" prong of
Article 23A even though petitioner had a certificate of good conduct from the State Board of Parole and
other significant evidence of rehabilitation. The Court permitted the denial of the license because the
Board had, at its discretion, balanced the factors in the petitioner's favor against those weighing the other
way-the maturity at the time of the offense, the serious nature of the crimes, and the interest of the State
in protecting the integrity of its sole form of legal gambling. Id. at 612, 615.
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amount of discretion in applying the "unreasonable risk" prong of § 752. The
New York State Court of Appeals has held that a determination of "unreasonable
risk" will stand up to judicial review as long as there is evidence that the
employer balanced the § 753 factors in the applicant's favor alongside those
against her.108 In Arrocha v. Board of Educ. of the City of New York, an applicant
for a license to teach high school Spanish provided the Board of Education with
his Certificate of Relief from Disabilities following a ten-year-old conviction for
the sale of a ten-dollar bag of cocaine. 109 Despite the presumption of rehabilita-
tion created by this certificate and evidence of the applicant's significant
academic and professional accomplishments since his conviction, the Board of
Education denied Arrocha the license. 110 A lower court ruled this rejection to be
arbitrary and capricious, stating, "Although the Board ostensibly reviewed the
eight factors set forth in Correction Law § 753(1), . . . the Board virtually ignored
the petitioner's extensive and unblemished record as a student tutor."
111
However, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Article 23A entitled the
Board to a subjective analysis of the eight factors in § 753 and that, as long as it
considered those factors, the Board could find an unreasonable risk to its
schoolchildren if it hired the applicant. 112 It thus appears that what a lower court
considered to be mere lip service to the balancing test required by § 753 can be a
valid exercise of an agency's discretion.
Thus, the New York State Court of Appeals' current interpretation of the
"unreasonable risk" prong of § 752 leaves employers with a troubling amount of
discretion. Under the current test, employers can point to a vast majority of
convictions as posing public safety risks, as in Arrocha, where the conviction in
question was a ten-year-old sale of a bag of cocaine worth ten dollars.113 This
definition of "unreasonable risk" is exceedingly broad. All an employer must do
is tip her hat in acknowledgment to the balancing test in § 753 before rejecting an
applicant under the "unreasonable risk" prong. By failing to delineate limited
circumstances and conditions under which employers can find the existence of
such a risk, New York State courts have crafted a standard so vague that it has
ceased to be useful.
3. Removal of Disabilities
New York State courts have similarly failed to recognize the law's requirement
that employers take into account certificates of relief from disabilities and other
evidence of rehabilitation. The language of Article 23A points to an intent on the
108. Arrocha v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, 93 N.Y.2d 361, 365 (N.Y 1999).
109. Id. at 363.
110. Id.
111. Arrocha v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, 677 N.YS.2d 584, 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).




part of the New York State Legislature to ensure that certificates of relief from
disabilities issued by the State play a significant role in the decisions of
employers. In addition to § 753(1)(g), which requires that an employer or agency
consider any evidence of rehabilitation as one of the eight factors in § 753(1),
§ 753(2) provides that an employer or agency "shall also" take into account an
applicant's certificate of relief from disabilities," 14 which "shall create a
presumption of rehabilitation in regard to the offense or offenses specified
therein."' 1 5 However, the New York State Court of Appeals has held that this
presumption of rehabilitation does not provide a prima facie entitlement to the
employment or license, and the agency or employer maintains the discretion to
deny the application after weighing the eight factors found in § 753(1), regardless
of any presumption resulting from § 753(2).116 In Arrocha, the Board of
Education did not have to rebut the presumption of rehabilitation that came from
Arrocha's certificate of relief from disabilities; the Board simply had to show that
it was aware of the presumption of rehabilitation when finding the existence of
unreasonable risk.' 1 7 A certificate of relief from disabilities may remain an
important tool with which an applicant can improve her chances under a
balancing of the eight factors in § 753(1). However, the court's interpretation of
§ 753(2) has diluted the impact of a certificate the very purpose of which is to
remove "any bar to... employment" caused by a prior conviction. 18
It is worth noting that while there are no other formal mechanisms in New York
prohibiting the consideration of criminal convictions when those convictions are
very old or when there is evidence of rehabilitation, some New York courts
recognize the fallibility of taking convictions into account after a certain amount
of time. In Ford v. Gilden, the First Department held that a landlord could not be
held liable for sexual abuses committed by an employee convicted of manslaugh-
ter twenty-seven years earlier.119 The First Department noted that the imposition
of liability would have "an unacceptably chilling effect on society's efforts to
reintegrate ex-offenders into mainstream society, contrary to precedent and the
explicitly stated public policy of the State."' 2 0 While the court in Ford v. Gilden
was not interpreting Article 23A, the case nevertheless supports an argument that
New York State courts should interpret state law so as to provide a mechanism
through which old convictions can be eliminated from consideration in employ-
114. The State Board of Parole can issue a certificate of relief from disabilities when the Board has
determined that (a) the applicant is an ex-offender convicted of not more than one felony, (b) the relief
granted is consistent with the rehabilitation of the applicant, and (c) the relief granted is consistent with
the public interest. N.Y. CoRREcr. LAW § 703(3) (McKinney 2005). A certificate of relief from disabilities
removes, "any bar to his employment automatically imposed by law by reason of his conviction of the
crime or of the offense specified therein." N.Y. CoRREcT. LAW § 701(1) (McKinney 2005).
115. N.Y. CORRECr. LAW § 753 (emphasis added).
116. Arrocha v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, 93 N.Y.2d 361, 365 (N.Y. 1999).
117. Id.
118. N.Y. CORRECr. LAW § 701(1) (McKinney 2005).
119. 200 A.D.2d 224 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
120. Id. at 229-230.
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ment-related decisions.
4. Administrative Review of § 753's Balancing Test
New York State courts have been inconsistent in their enforcement of the
requirement that agencies consider the series of factors listed in § 753. While the
New York State Court of Appeals has held that for a decision to pass
administrative review, an agency must acknowledge the § 753 factors, at least
one lower court has granted agencies the discretion to deny employment
opportunities to ex-offenders without evidence that they considered the necessary
factors. In Arrocha, the Court of Appeals held that in order to pass the arbitrary
and capricious test,1 2 t an employer or agency must show that they have taken into
account the eight factors listed in § 753. 122 However, in Bevacqua v. Sobol, the
Third Department affirmed a denial of a medical license by the New York
Committee on the Profession because of an applicant's past conviction for
receiving child pornography. 123 There was no explicit weighing of the § 753
factors in the Committee's written determination; the court held that although the
agency, "do[es] not state in [its] ... written determinations that they considered
and evaluated each of those factors, it must be presumed, absent record evidence
to the contrary, that they did indeed do so. ' ' 124 It is therefore possible for a court to
uphold a denial of license or employment without an explicit reference on the
part of the employer to the statutory requirement that it consider the factors listed
in § 753.
In contrast, a pair of recent decisions demonstrates that some lower courts are
not afraid to overturn an agency's denial of an employment opportunity if the
agency has not considered evidence of an individual's rehabilitation or other
positive factors. This promising trend is exemplified by La Cloche v. Daniels, in
which a lower court reversed an administrative law judge's refusal to grant a
barber apprentice certificate of registration to an individual solely because of a
conviction of first degree robbery ten years earlier.1 25 The court held that while
Article 28, governing the issuance of barber certificates, allows the agency to take
into account an individual's moral character, Article 23A forbids them to base
such a determination on a prior conviction without taking into account evidence
of rehabilitation or any of the other factors under § 753. 126 Petitioner La Cloche
had trained to be barber in a vocational program while incarcerated at Clinton
121. New York State administrative law holds that, if an agency determination is either administrative
in nature or the result of a hearing not required by law, "the courts cannot interfere unless there is no
rational basis for the exercise of discretion or the action complained of is 'arbitrary and capricious."'
Matter of Pell v. Bd. of Educ. of Union Free School Dist., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231 (N.Y. 1974).
122. See Arrocha v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, 93 N.Y.2d 361, 365 (N.Y 1999).
123. 579 N.Y.S.2d 243, 245 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
124. Id. at 5.
125. 755 N.Y.S.2d 827, 829 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
126. Id. at 828, citing N.Y GEN. Bus. LAW § 430 (McKinney 2003).
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Correctional Facility, and the court further noted that a denial of a barber
certificate based on his criminal record would undermine the very purpose of
offering such a program in prison.' 27
In Davis-Elliott v. New York City Department of Education, the New York
County Supreme Court similarly reversed a denial of employment as a parent
coordinator with the Department of Education, citing the failure of the
Department to consider all eight factors in § 753 when making their determina-
tion. 128 Petitioner Davis-Elliott had been employed with the Department of
Education for two years when she applied for a promotion. Though the
Department initially promoted Davis-Elliot, the Department rescinded its offer
when it learned that she had been convicted of five misdemeanors related to
shoplifting. 129 Davis-Elliott was otherwise qualified-the offenses occurred
twelve years earlier, she had successfully worked for the Department for two
years, and she had received favorable reviews from supervisors. The court held
that because the letter from the Department to Davis-Elliott explaining its
decision failed to address these qualifications or the other factors from § 753 that
would have weighed in Davis-Elliott's favor, the decision was reversible as
arbitrary and capricious. 130 Both Davis-Elliott and La Cloche underscore the
importance that Article 23A maintains today as a protection against an
administrative denial of employment based on an unrelated past conviction when
that denial does not pay heed to the factors listed in § 753.
The New York State Court of Appeals has indicated that employers and
agencies must show that they have considered all relevant factors listed in § 753
that weigh in an applicant's favor before denying that applicant a license or
employment opportunity for interpretation of § 753.131 In practice, the uneven
application of the balancing test laid out in § 753 results in a system in which the
state fails to consistently hold employers and agencies accountable for the
employment decisions they make. Without the regular application of § 753's
balancing test, New York's law ceases to be the distinctive model of progressive
legislation to which scholars point as the most effective state statute at increasing
employment opportunities for ex-offenders.1
32
5. The Need for Reform
The limited conception of rational employment decisions displayed by New
York state courts suggests a need for statutory reform if Article 23A is to reflect a
real state policy promoting the hiring of ex-offenders. The law does maintain an
127. Id. at 829.
128. 10/21/2004 N.Y.L.J. 18 (col. 1).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Arrocha v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, 93 N.Y.2d 361, 364 (N.Y. 1999).
132. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 78.
No. 2]
The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy
important position as a formal statement of such a policy-even in Bonacorsa v.
Van Lindt, the first New York Court of Appeals case to diminish the strength of
Article 23A's language, the court cited the original model act by Meltsner et al.
and wrote of the law's history,
Studies established that the bias against employing or licensing ex-offenders
was not only widespread but particularly unfair and counterproductive ....
Failure to find employment not only resulted in personal frustration but also
injured society as a whole by contributing to a high rate of recidivism ....
Article 23-A sought to remove this obstacle to employment by imposing an
obligation on employers and public agencies to deal equitably with ex-
offenders while also protecting society's interest in assuring performance by
reliable and trustworthy persons.1 33
This statement reflects a crucial awareness on the part of the judiciary of the
many obstacles, legal and otherwise, faced by ex-offenders seeking employment.
That ten years later the First Department could discuss the state's "public policy
that prohibits discrimination in hiring on the basis of a criminal record,' 134 and
that in 2004 the New York County Supreme Court could cite this public policy in
reversing the Department of Education's denial of a job solely because of a prior
conviction1 35 reveal that an awareness of Article 23A's underlying philosophy
remains.
Yet even as they recognize the statute's underlying policy, New York courts
interpreting Article 23A have undermined that very policy by allowing agencies
and employers to stretch the limits of the statutory language. Article 23A can and
should do a better job of limiting the instances in which employers and agencies
can base employment decisions on criminal records. To begin with, technical
changes to the law might help courts realize that the purpose of the statute is
thwarted by an interpretation that allows employers to discriminate against
individuals with criminal records as long as they can articulate a reason for doing
so. Based on the case law analyzed above, changes to the statutory language
might:
(1) Limit the application of the "direct relationship" test to instances in which
an element of the crime itself directly parallels a duty or potential risk of
the employment or license sought;
(2) Reduce employer discretion under the second exception of Article 23A, the
"unreasonable risk" test;
(3) Institute a formal mechanism through which individuals with evidence of
133. Bonacorsa v. Van Lindt, 71 N.Y.2d 605, 611 (N.Y. 1988), citing Meltsner et al., supra note 81,
and 1976 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN., at 50.
134. Givens v. New York City Hous. Auth., 671 N.YS.2d 479,479.
135. Davis-Elliott v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 10/21/2004 N.Y.L.J. 18 (col. 1).
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rehabilitation can remove their criminal records from consideration in
employment decisions; and
(4) Insist that agencies and employers explicitly balance the eight individual-
ized factors required by the law.
Such changes would increase the accountability of agencies and employers and
underscore the individualized, factor-based approach that makes Article 23A
unique. Given the large numbers of New Yorkers released from prisons each year
and the state's recent focus on the re-integration of ex-offenders into society,
there is some hope that the reform of Article 23A will present a politically viable
way of increasing employment opportunities for ex-offenders. However, changes
to the statutory language of the law will not by themselves be enough.
IV. A ROADMAP FOR CHANGE
A. Towards a New Rationality
In order to overcome fully the legal barriers to the successful protection of
ex-offenders from employment discrimination, it is first necessary to rethink the
prevailing concept of "rationality" as it relates to discrimination against
individuals with criminal records. Changes to Article 23A's statutory language,
while necessary, will not on their own prevent courts from continuing to validate
the seemingly rational decisions of employers turning away ex-offenders. What
if, rather than thinking of the consequences of each hiring decision on the
individual employer, judges were instructed to think of the effect that the
repeated denial of jobs to people with criminal records has on society as a whole?
Viewed in this light, the purpose of encouraging the hiring of ex-offenders
through legal restrictions such as those in Article 23A becomes to reduce
recidivism and facilitate the reentry of ex-offenders into their communities,
thereby reducing the costs to society imposed by concentrated incidents of crime.
Such a vision does not depend upon sympathy for ex-offenders, but rather on the
assumption, argued above, that the best way to reduce public safety risks (or
"unreasonable risk," in the words of Article 23A) is to employ people coming out
of jails and prisons so that they commit fewer crimes and can become healthy,
productive members of society. 136 Indeed, traditional notions of cost and risk lose
their grip when they fail to acknowledge the effect that the exclusion of
ex-offenders from mainstream society has on public safety and the economy.
Here, Sam Bagenstos' critique of the divide between "rational" and "irratio-
nal" discrimination as it relates to the ADA proves useful. Bagenstos argues that
"antidiscrimination law aims at wholesale, not retail, injustice"; he contends that
the purpose of antidiscrimination laws, both those seen as forbidding irrational
136. See Part I, supra.
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discrimination and those that impose constraints on rational behavior, is not to
"enforce a uniform norm of ethical conduct on individual employers," but rather
"to overcome systematic patterns of stigma and subordination by targeting a
practice of occupational segregation that undergirds those patterns."1 37 For
Bagenstos, the value of antidiscrimination laws such as the ADA is that they seek
to combat the social and economic exclusion of marginalized groups. Taking this
view, it does not matter how "rational" an individual employer's decision is.
Instead, the focus becomes the extent to which laws are successful at remedying
targeted inequalities when balanced against the costs to employers of following
those laws. Viewed through such a framework, laws which encourage the hiring
of ex-offenders--even in situations where not hiring an individual with a
criminal record would be otherwise understandable given concerns over safety-
begin to makes sense.
Bagenstos' focus on combating "systematic patterns of stigma and subordina-
tion" is certainly relevant to the obstacles faced by individuals with criminal
convictions in America He describes members of excluded groups as those who
"are stigmatized as less than full citizens"1 3 8-this has been an accurate
description of ex-offenders since prisons were first substituted for traditional
shaming punishments in the early 19th century.139 Such stigmatization has only
increased with the escalation of the collateral consequences of criminal
convictions in the last quarter of the 20th century.1 40 Indeed, the concept of
"systemic... subordination" can be and is often applied to the criminalization of
African Americans in contemporary society; employment discrimination against
ex-offenders fits into a pattern of legal mechanisms that facilitate the social and
economic exclusion of minorities in America.1
4 1
In addition, unlike with the requirements of "reasonable accommodation"
under the ADA, one can present a cost-based efficiency argument in favor of
employing ex-offenders. To begin with, one can point to the $40 billion that the
nation spends each year on incarcerating Americans, many of who are repeat
137. Sam Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination, " Accomodation, and the Politics of(Disability) Civil
Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 837 (2003).
138. Id. at 842. Bagenstos could be talking about the labeling theory of criminology when he writes
that, when social groups are excluded from employment opportunities, "The result may be a vicious cycle
of exclusion, in which members of subordinated groups rationally respond to exclusion by failing to
develop their human capital, and employers, rationally believing that members of those groups are less
likely to have developed their human capital, discriminate even more." Id. at 843. For an overview of
labeling theory, see HowARD S. BECKER, THE OuTsIDERs (1963). "The deviant is one to whom that label
has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label." Id. at 8.
139. See KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS 15 (1966).
140. See Travis, supra note 16, at 19 (arguing that collateral consequences of criminal convictions
"create a permanent diminution in social status of convicted offenders, a distancing between 'us' and
'them.' ")
141. See Wacquant, supra note 15, at 119-121 (describing the "civic death" of African American
ex-offenders as a result of the collateral consequences of criminal convictions.)
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offenders. 142 When those fiscal costs are combined with the human costs of
releasing individuals from prison without adequate job prospects and into already
marginalized communities, one is left with a powerful argument in favor of legal
rules that encourage employers to hire those individuals. As President Bush
noted, we can no longer afford to ignore the more than 600,000 new ex-offenders
re-entering society each year. A new concept of rationality should recognize this
fact, targeting policies that reinforce the exclusion of individuals with criminal
records from the labor force, and, by extension, challenging a system of
stigmatization that encourages recidivism.
Reformers pursuing such a rethinking of the concept of "rationality" in
employment discrimination should endeavor to infuse such language into
existing statutory schemes. In New York, for example, reforms aimed at
increasing the effectiveness of Article 23A should consider not only changes in
the technical language of the statute, but also the addition of statutory preambles
and/or mandates within the legislation that explicitly recognize the savings in
costs to society that the law seeks to achieve. In addition, as I argue below,
statutory reforms should be accompanied by efforts to influence public percep-
tions of the role of ex-offenders in society.
B. Preventing Backlash through Normative Change
In addition to pursuing a shift in the rhetoric of rationality surrounding the
employment of ex-offenders, efforts at reform should attempt to influence public
perceptions of the position of former prisoners in American communities. Linda
Kreiger has connected normative perceptions of marginalized groups to the
success of legal protections aimed at those groups. 143 In the context of the ADA,
Kreiger has argued that "[b]acklash tends to emerge when the application of a
transformative legal regime generates outcomes that diverge too sharply from
entrenched norms and institutions to which influential segments of the relevant
population retain strong, conscious allegiance. ' 44 This occurred with the ADA
when Congress pursued a normative shift in the treatment of individuals with
disabilities for which society was not prepared. Kreiger writes, "We can expect
hindsight bias of this sort to operate even more powerfully where a specific type
of risk is associated in popular myth or stereotype with members of a stigmatized
group. '145 This connection between entrenched normative views and legal
backlash is important to keep in mind when pursuing changes in the legal barriers
faced by ex-offenders, who have been powerfully associated with risk in the
public mind since (if not before) the much-publicized recidivism of Willie
142. MAUER, supra note 10, at 81.
143. Kreiger, supra note 67, at 476.
144. Id. at 477.
145. Id. at 482.
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Horton during the 1988 presidential campaign. 146
The New York State Court of Appeals' interpretation of Article 23A fits into
Kreiger's theory of how judicial bias emerges in response to public resentment
towards protected groups. Kreiger sounds like she could be describing the case
law surrounding Article 23A rather than the backlash against the ADA when she
writes, "Entrenched norms and institutionalized practices, operating as taken-for-
granted background rules, systematically skew the interpretations of transforma-
tive legal rules so that those rules increasingly come to resemble the normative
and institutional systems they were intended to displace." 147 Such is the case with
the judicial enforcement of Article 23A, through which New York State courts
have legitimized the assumption that excluding individuals from employment is
rational when those individuals possess criminal records. If there has not been an
obvious "backlash" against Article 23A in the way that there was against the
ADA, it is because the law has never been interpreted expansively; rather,
beginning with Bonacorsa in 1988 (coincidentally, the same year as the Willie
Horton advertisements), the Court of Appeals set about restricting the meaning of
the law to fit into a perceived sense of reason and rationality in relation to the
criminality of ex-offenders 
1 48
Similarly, judicial interpretations of Article 23A have validated the underlying
normative assumption that individuals with criminal records are not deserving of
special protections. In reviewing decisions of employers and agencies, New York
courts have focused on the moral failures of individuals as evidenced by their
past convictions rather than on the Act's mandate to weigh an individual's
positive qualifications and evidence of rehabilitation against the risks to public
safety.149 By zeroing in on the past moral indiscretions of individual candidates
for employment, such reasoning ignores the moral implications of policies that
hold individuals accountable for crimes years after they have completed their
criminal sanctions and release ex-offenders into communities-mostly minority
communities-in which the likelihood that they will be able to procure a
legitimate source of income is slim.
Efforts to increase the strength of statutes like Article 23A should therefore
focus not only on legislative reform, but also on engaging the public in a
campaign aimed at changing attitudes towards ex-offenders. In New York, the
146. See Lenhardt, supra note 63, at 860. ("The Willie Horton ad shown during President George
W. H. Bush's 1988 presidential campaign to enhance perceptions of Bush's stance on crime .... was
nothing if not an effort to inflame white fear of black criminality and sexual deviance through the use of
the black brute stereotype.") For additional analysis of the effects of the advertisement, which described
how Willie Horton had raped and murdered a woman while on weekend release under a program signed
into law by Governor Michael Dukakis, see Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: "De-coding" Racial
Slurs During the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611, 626-27 (2000).
147. Kreiger, supra note 67, at 486.
148. Bonacorsa v. Van Lindt, 71 N.Y.2d 605, 613 (N.Y. 1988).
149. See, e.g., Al Turi Landfill, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 751 N.Y.S.2d
827, 828-39 (N.Y. 2002); Bevacqua v. Sobol, 579 N.Y.S.2d 243, 245 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
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potential of such a campaign can already be seen in the successful efforts of a
coalition of reformers to seek changes to the state's draconian drug laws, which
were modestly amended by the state legislature in December of 2004.150 Public
campaigns should not be afraid to specify strategies-such as promoting the
employment of ex-offenders-that can ease the burdens faced by individuals
released from prison while simultaneously improving the social and economic
conditions of communities. Kreiger warns that, "Vulnerability to backlash
increases ... if a transformative legal regime is normatively ambiguous or
opaque."' 5 1 Public campaign strategies should therefore wed a focus on the
plight of ex-offenders entering underserved communities with the strong
normative argument that the denial of employment opportunities to ex-offenders
runs counter to the goal of a just society.
CONCLUSION
A focus on the economic and public safety benefits of proposed legal reforms
can go hand in hand with efforts to change the image of ex-offenders from the
undeserving to the competent; indeed, they can and should reinforce each other.
As Stein has observed, "[p]erhaps the most expedient way to transform social
norms is through increasing society's familiarity with a previously unknown
group that it perceives, in sociological terms, as 'other.' ' 1 52 It is my hope that in
the wake of the 20th century's focus on mass incarceration, Americans will come
to recognize that the growing numbers of ex-offenders entering their communi-
ties each year need the support of society and of its laws in order to succeed. In
turn, this support leads to safer and more inclusive communities. If this
realization is to occur on a large scale, we must maintain an emphasis within both
statutory reforms and public campaigns on the notion that encouraging the
employment of ex-offenders is both morally appropriate and rational for society
as a whole.
150. The efforts of a coalition of reformers centered on demonstrating the effects of the drug laws on
families of the incarcerated and their communities. See, e.g., the "Drop the Rock" campaign organized by
the Correctional Association of New York, at http://www.droptherock.org.
151. Kreiger, supra note 67, at 486.
152. Stein, supra note 40, at 671.
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